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ABSTRACT 
Risk allocation preferences are important elements of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), as the fundamental 
tension in many negotiations between the public and private sector in PPPs usually comes down to the 
question: who is responsible for managing a particular risk? Yet research literature suggests that risk 
allocation preferences phenomena have not been adequately studied; hence they remain poorly understood. This 
paper provides an empirical analysis and study of risk allocation preferences in PPPs in Nigeria.  
Research participants (spanning banking, construction, and public sector groups who were selected 
through a convenience sampling method) completed an online survey with Likert-type items within six months 
(i.e. between June and November 2011) to gauge probabilities of occurrence, risk impact and risk significance 
of 46 risk factors pertaining to PPP projects. As data did not meet the assumptions for parametric statistics, 
Mann-Whitney U tests were performed to evaluate the ranked differences in the independent variables (46 
risk factors) between private and public sector groups.  
This paper shows that 27 (59%) out of the 46 risk factors are preferred to be allocated to the 
private sector, while 8 (17%) risk factors are to be allocated to the public sector and 11 (24%) of the risk 
factors are to be equally shared between the private and public sectors. 
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All over the world, there is a growing appetite for Public-Private Partnership (PPP) as a 
vehicle for the delivery of public infrastructure projects. This model aimed at harnessing 
private sector capital and efficiency gains by allocating risks to the party best able to manage 
them optimally.1 Proponents of the PPP model believe that a genuine transfer of risk to the 
private sector must be done to support the overriding principle that a project must provide 
value-for-money to the taxpayer. This principle is hinged on the risk transfer argument that 
compensates for higher cost of capital used by private sector partners (Akintoye and Beck, 
2009).2  It is widely believed that PPP is an effective approach to enhance infrastructure 
project delivery by bringing in management efficiency and creative skills from the business 
world, and reducing public sector involvement by using private sectors in the provision of 
infrastructure services. In other words, its usage is largely driven by the belief that 
governments should ‗steer more and row less‘. 
Given that PPP can be viewed as a bundle of rights, obligations and risks are 
allocated among various project participants; at issue in the design of every PPP contractual  
structure is how public and private partners can price and optimally allocate risks between 
themselves.3 In other words, the assessment of risk and who is best able to manage it needs 
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1 In 1992, the UK embarked upon a new type of PPP, known as the Private Finance Initiative (PFI). Under this 
arrangement, the private sector firms take on the responsibility for providing a public serve including 
maintaining, enhancing or constructing the necessary infrastructure required. The essential feature of PFI is 
that the infrastructure is built and owned by the private sector, the public sector purchasing the flow of services 
(directly or indirectly) from the asset rather than the infrastructure asset that provides the services. 
2 Much of the case for PPP rests on the relative efficiency of the private sector. While there is an extensive 
literature on this aspect, the theory is ambiguous and the empirical evidence is mixed. However, PPP are more 
likely to result in efficiency gains that offset higher private sector borrowing costs if they have the following 
three characteristics: a) the quality of services can be readily defined and measured; b) there is adequate risk 
transfer to the private sector, and c) there is either competition or incentive-based regulation. See IMF 2006 
report titled: ―Public Private Partnerships, Government Guarantees, and Fiscal Risk‖ prepared by a Staff Team 
Led by Richard Hemming. In general, infrastructure project finance is usually held to be more expensive than 
public debt; indeed the rates paid by project sponsors are usually higher than rates paid by government debt 
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to be carefully considered in the design of PPP contracts. It can therefore be argued that the 
real success of PPP projects depends on the degree to which risk is genuinely transferred 
from the public to the private sector and optimally shared (Hodge and Greve, 2005).  
The questions of risk allocation preferences in the design of PPP contractual 
structure are uniquely important in Nigeria.4 Arguably, the inability to understand and 
control for certain critical elements in PPP contract design (such as risk allocation 
preferences) had accounted for the slow take off of PPP projects in tackling huge 
infrastructure challenges in the country.5 For instance, statistical evidence shows that only 51 
projects amounting to $21 billion reached financial and contractual closure between 1990 
and 2008 in Nigeria out of which three have been cancelled6; and not all of the projects were 
executed using PPPs. 
The objective of this paper therefore is to identify preferred risk allocations in PPP 
projects in Nigeria. The aim is to better understand risk allocation preferences of parties so 
as to eliminate lengthy contract negotiations in PPPs. The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows: sections two and three review the existing literature on risk allocation preferences, 
particularly within the agency theoretic framework, section four reviews the methodology, 
section five presents the results and discussions thereon while section six presents the 
conclusions and recommendations. 
 
2. RISK ALLOCATION PREFERENCES  
A core principle of any PPP is the allocation of risk to the party best able to manage it at the 
least cost. The aim is to optimize rather than maximize risk transfer, to ensure that best value 
is achieved. A party must be willing to accept a risk based on risk pricing and subsequent 
negotiations on risk allocation. It bears mentioning therefore that one of the critical ‗Value 
for Money‘ (VFM) drivers in a PPP transaction is the transfer of risks to the private sector 
(others are, whole-of-life costing, innovation, earlier project delivery and asset utilization, 
Hayford, 2006). However, this transfer of risk comes at a price, and attempts to transfer 
risks, which the public sector is better placed to manage than the private sector can damage 
the VFM proposition of a PPP transaction. The transfer will only improve VFM if the price 
charged by the private sector to manage the risk is less than what it would cost government 
to manage the risk itself. 
In PPPs, the risk allocation is usually more complex than the traditional construction 
contracts, where the demand risk, for example would typically be borne by the government, 
(i.e. where government is the procurer of projects e.g. roads, hospitals etc.) Identification, 
disclosure and appropriate allocation of risk are therefore critical to the PPP environment. 
Generally, there are mixed and divergent views on how partners prefer various infrastructure 
project risks to be allocated in PPP contracts.  For example, Grimsey and Lewis suggest that 
it is more appealing for the government to shift project risks from the public sector to the 
consortium involved with the project even though this requires a profit incentive to be 
provided to the project consortium. They argue that the transfer of risks to the private sector 
provides an incentive for private entities to maximize efficiency. But for this transfer to 
happen, a clear property rights must be created (2004). 
 Engel et al. (2010) for instance shows that with financing considerations, it is 
optimal to transfer demand risk to the government. They argue that since PPPs involve large 
upfront investments, exogenous demand risk is an important concern of lenders when user 
fees are the main revenue source, so by assigning it to the government, the risk and therefore 
the interest rates charged to the project fall. However, even when projects are based on 
                                                 
4 Crucially too, the exercise of risk allocation is one of the most important steps in assessing and developing the 
bankability of PPP projects. In particular, transferring to the private sector partner the risks that it is better able 
to control or mitigate can help lower the overall project cost, and improve value for money. However, the 
more total risk transferred to the private sector partner, the higher the return- or risk premium- the equity 
investors will require, and the harder it will be to raise debt finance or the less bankable the project will 
become. 
5 In Nigeria, the collapse of public infrastructure is obviously one of the most discussed issues by policymakers 
and concerned stakeholders. Clearly, the challenges are legion: roads have become death traps, epileptic power 
supply, decrepit rail system, unreliable security system, substandard airports, poor health and educational 
institutions among others. For instance in the power sector, Nigeria, a country of over 150 million people is 
still generating less than 3,500 megawatts, whereas Alberta, a province to 3.5 million Canadians is generating 
about 13,000 megawatts. USA with a population of 308 million people generates 700,000 MW, South Africa 
generates 40,000 MW for its 50 million people, and Brazil generates 100,000 MW for its 192 million people. See 
Alberta Electric System Operator‘s report titled ―Powering Albertans‖ Volume 4 issue 1, www.allafrica.com 
accessed on April 20, 2010: report titled ―Nigeria: As Power Generation drops to 3,200 MW‖ and a report 
presented by Ayo Gbeleyi, Director General – PPP Office Lagos titled ―Powering Africa‘s Megacity‖ 
November 18, 2009. 
6 See-The World Bank‘s database on private participation in infrastructure- http://ppi.worldbank.org/  
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availability payments (and thus there is no demand risk), the finance rates charged PPPs are 
higher than the rates charged on government debt. In this case, the higher rate reflects in 
part the risk that the infrastructure will be unavailable at some point in the life of the 
contract, and no payments will be received to service the debt.  
Li et al. (2005) recommend a risk allocation framework, in which the public sector 
client retains political risks and the risk pertaining to project site availability. According to 
this study, both the public sector client and private sector contractor should share the risks 
pertaining to general legislation, force majeure and relationship, while the contractor should 
take most of the project risks. The allocation of some risk factors, like obtaining project 
approval and permit, varies with different projects, and depends on prevalent circumstances. 
The underlying assumption of risk aversion forms the basis of understanding the risk 
allocation preferences of partners. This suggests that partners can generally avoid or shift 
certain risks even when prima facie they are best able to manage them. This runs contrary to 
the notion of optimism bias7 where partners would deliberately downplay risks embedded in 
infrastructure projects in order to move forward with the business case for the project and 
then turn around in an opportunistic manner to request for a contract renegotiation; usually 
without a competitive tension typical of the original bidding process thereby eroding value 
for money. 
Public partner may exhibit low perception for risks (risk aversion) when its 
assessment of risk management capability of the private sector partner is low. In that case it 
may not want to share in certain types of risks such as demand risks (with user fees). 
Nevertheless, it is important that risk allocation be symmetrical: in other words, if one party 
accepts the consequences of a downside risk, it should also gain the benefits of an upside 
risk (Grimsey and Lewis 2004). 
Since stakeholders have a significant impact on decisions made in the ongoing 
management of a PPP project, it is important to understand their preferences in the 
allocation of project risks. Risk allocation preferences may vary because of differences in 
underlying assumptions and interests resulting in disagreements over risk priorities and 
mitigation strategies. The risk allocation preferences of stakeholders predicted in this study 
suggests that while most of the endogenous risk factors could be assigned to the private 
sector partner, the public sector should retain political and site acquisition risks, while 
relationship-based risks should be shared between the partners.  
 
1. Risk Allocation Preferences and Agency Theory 
Agency theory is truly interdisciplinary. It is a general model of social relations involving the 
delegation of authority, and generally resulting in problems of control, which has been 
applied to a broad range of substantive contexts across different disciplines. According to 
the widely cited Eisenhardt, (1989), agency theory has been used by researchers in 
accounting, economics, finance, marketing, political science, organizational behaviour and 
sociology. Moreover, Kiser critically x-rays the intellectual evolution of agency theory in 
three disciplines—economics, political science, and sociology. He argues that agency theory 
in economics was initiated by the work of Berhold (1971), Ross (1973), and especially Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) as a way to address problems of control that arise as a result of 
information asymmetries between agents delegated to carry out tasks that affect the welfare 
of the principals who delegated authority to them (1999). 
There are several good summaries of agency theory in the literature (see for example 
(Macdolnald, 1984, Eisenhardt, 1989, Petersen, 1993 and Kiser, 1999). Eisenhardt, (1989) in 
particular distinguished between two paradigms of agency theory: positive agency framework 
and principal-agent framework. Positivist researchers have focused on identifying situations 
in which the principal and agent are likely to have conflicting goals and then describing the 
governance mechanisms that limit the agent's self-serving behaviour. Positivist research is 
less mathematical than principal-agent research. Also, positivist researchers have focused 
almost exclusively on the special case of the principal-agent relationship between owners and 
managers of large, public corporations (Berle & Means, 1932, Eisenhardt, 1989). Along this 
line, agency theorists have identified a number of variables that influence the relationship 
between the risk preferences of owners and managers: risk attitudes of the principal and 
agent, outcome uncertainty, and information systems (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The positive branch of agency theory has much in common with the basic hidden 
action model (moral hazard). Both are primarily concerned with the design of appropriate 
governance and control mechanisms, though the positive branch has tended to be more 
                                                 






narrowly focused on inter organizational relationships such as PPPs. One unique difference 
in the positive approach however is that it seems to adopt the assumption that agents are 
risk neutral rather than risk averse, an assumption that is also common in transaction cost 
economics (Williamson 1988). Generally, the positive branch is non-mathematical and 
empirically oriented and focuses in particular on the effects of market and institutional 
mechanisms that affect the contracting process.  The tension between the two branches of 
agency theory partly results from the different approaches developed by each branch and 
partly from the fact that the mathematical approach of the principal-agent literature offers 
little insight "to explain the rich variety of observed contracting practices," and in particular, 
when it comes to analyzing the effects of market and institutional mechanisms in the forms 
of contracts. On the other hand, positive theory of agency literature appears to offer better 
insights to explain the variety of contracting practices and how market mechanisms affect 
the contracting process. This theory is also more likely to produce practical conclusions in 
terms of economic policy (Eisenhardt, 1998). 
In general however, agency theory broadens the risk-sharing literature to include the 
so-called agency problem that occurs when cooperating parties have different goals and 
division of labour (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). Specifically, agency theory is 
directed at the ubiquitous agency relationship, in which one party (the principal) delegates 
work to another (the agent), who performs that work. Agency theory attempts to describe 
this relationship using the metaphor of a contract (Jensen & Meckling, 1976 cited in 
Eisenhardt, 1998).  Therefore, the role of risk becomes an important innovation in the 
economic theory of agency. Economists recognize that agency relations involve not only 
problems of control but issues of risk-sharing as well (Kiser, 1999). 
Essentially, agency theory is focused on resolving two problems that can occur in 
agency relationships. The first is the agency problem that arises when (a) the desires or goals 
of the principal and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to 
verify what the agent is actually doing ex post. The problem here is that the principal cannot 
verify that the agent has behaved appropriately. The second is the problem of risk sharing 
that arises when the principal and agent have different attitudes toward risk. The problem 
here is that the principal and the agent may prefer different actions because of the different 
risk perceptions. To be clear, the two key elements of agency theory are goal conflict 
(incongruence) and information asymmetry; they are the spark plugs that power the theory. 
On the first agency problem: several conflicting goals inherently exist among the 
three major constituencies involved in public-private partnerships; thus leading to 
compounded agency problem: i.e. public sector operating as the contracting authority, the 
private sector and the consumers or end users of services. The public sector partner for 
example has the goal of job creation and increasing services to the public8; the private sector 
organization‘s goal is to maximize the value of the firm; and the consumers‘ goal is to 
maximize consumer surplus.  
Theoretically, in PPPs, the private firm is an agent for the public organization, in 
providing a piece of infrastructure, and the public organization is an agent for the 
consumers, who finance the public organization through taxes and fees. Thus, the public 
organization is accountable to the customers of its own agent. It, therefore, has a 
responsibility to ensure that the agent acts in the best interests of the consumers.  
Engel et al (2010) argue that the life cycle of PPP finance and the change in financing 
sources is determined by the different incentive problems faced in the two stages of the PPP: 
its construction and operational phases. Construction is subject to substantial uncertainty; 
major design changes and costs depend crucially on the diligence of the sponsor and the 
building contractor. Thus, there is ample scope for moral hazard at this stage. As is well 
known (Tirole 2006; Yescombe 2007), banks perform a monitoring role that is well suited to 
mitigate moral hazard by exercising tight control over changes to the project‘s contract and 
the behaviour of the special purpose vehicle and her contractors. In order to control 
behaviour, banks disburse funds only gradually as project stages are completed. After 
completion and ramp-up of the project, risk falls abruptly and is limited to events that may 
affect cash flows. 
                                                 
8 This goal aligns with the Public Interest Theory of Regulation (PITR) analysed in Boardman and Vining 
(2012). This is a normative perspective and it is different from the Economic Theory of Regulation (ETR) 
which focuses on what governments do do. The basic argument is that governmental action will be based on, or 
at least significantly influenced by, the self-interest of politicians and bureaucrats: such as seeking to maximise 
votes or scoring political points. PITR in particular focuses on the presence of market failures and 
governments‘ role in correcting these failures. PITR is inherently normative, as it focuses on what governments 
should do. 
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To deal with adverse selection problems- public sector partner can offer a menu of 
contracts to private sector bidders at pre-deal stages. The public client (principal) would 
express its expected risk allocation framework (i.e. initial risk matrix) along the invitation to 
negotiation/tender document, by setting out a list of the main risks contained within the 
scheme, and bidders are required to specify their views on:  
 
 The probability of each risk event occurring;  
 The cost consequences (impact), if the event did occur; and  
 Whether they were prepared to take all, or part of the risk, within their bid 
price.  
 
The individual bidders (potential agents) would assess the client‘s proposition and 
either agree or disagree. Ultimately, the iterative evaluation of risks by these agents enables 
them to reach a decision on whether they should bear certain risks or part of certain risks or 
not. Furthermore, having assessed and mitigated all risks, the PPP contract would invariably 
reflect the final allocation of risks between the private and public sector partners (Akintoye 
et al, 2003).  
Another important element of agency problems in PPPs is the tendency to result in 
some self-selection. This is common where unsolicited bids are considered by governments: 
for instance, a risk-averse agent (private sector) may want to get government engaged in the 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) by creating a rosy picture of a project or underplay the risks 
in a project. In that case, the government may succumb particularly where it doesn‘t have a 
clear framework for dealing with unsolicited bids or where it is fully ‗sold out‘ based on the 
optimism bias of the private sector. It is crucial to also note that agency theory overlaps 
contract theory because the unit of analysis is the contract governing the relationship 
between the principal and the agent. The focus of agency theory is on determining the most 
efficient contract governing the principal-agent relationship given assumptions about people 
(e.g., self-interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion), organizations (e.g., goal conflict among 
members), and information (e.g., information is a commodity which can be purchased). 
In conclusion, drawing from the perspectives of the agent theorists, the following 
pattern of risk allocation could be predicted between the public and private sector partners: 
the risks that are solely within the control of private sector are allocated wholly to the private 
sector (such as demand risk under a user-fee regime, design risk etc.), while the risks that are 
solely within the control of the public sector are allocated wholly to the public sector; where 
risks are partly controlled by both parties, such risks are shared. 
 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this quantitative study is to show how stakeholders involved in PPPs prefer 
risks to be allocated. Responses were received from 45 participants with varied interest 
and/or experience with PPPs and the survey was administered between June and November 
2011. In all, 285 professionals in the Nigerian PPP space were invited to participate in the 
study. 
Out of about 285 questionnaires administered to respondents between June and 
November 2011 through Qualtrics, 45 responded, while 1 of the responses is invalid.9 
Although only 45 samples were collected, the number of samples was deemed adequate and 
representative when compared with other similar studies on risk management in 
infrastructure projects. For example, 35 responses were obtained in Kartam and Kartam 
(2001)'s questionnaire survey on risk management in the Kuwaiti construction industry; and 
92 survey responses were collected by Rahman and Kumaraswamy (2004) on joint risk 
management in Hong Kong. In the only similar study carried out (to the learner‘s 
knowledge) in Nigeria so far (i.e. Ibrahim et al. 2006), 42 questionnaires were returned out of 
the 150 distributed, of which only 36 are usable. This represents a 24% effective response 
rate. Moreover, 70 responses were collected in El-Sayegh's research on risk assessment and 
risk allocation in the construction industry of the United Arab Emirates (2008). Also in a 
recent and similar study i.e. (Ke et al. 2010) a total of 47 completed questionnaires were 
returned representing a response rate of 23% in China‘s PPP projects. Lastly, in the most 
recent study (also in China‘s PPP projects), Chan et al. (2011) sent out a total of 580 
questionnaires and received a total of 105 valid responses for data analysis representing 18% 
response rate. 
                                                 
9 Qualtrics is an online survey platform used by scholars from different institutions including Haskeyne School 






Convenience sampling technique (non-probability) was used to draw participants to 
the study. Here, sampling was done on the basis of availability and ease of data collection 
while also paying close attention to the suitability of participants. The ―captive samples‖ 
(group of individuals who are accessible to the investigator) for the survey in this study was 
drawn largely from the banking sector; although participants cut across the three selected 
stakeholder groups: Financiers, Clients (Public Sector) and Operators (Private Sector). This 
type of sampling method is called judgement sampling and is a variant of purposive sampling 
or non-probability sampling technique. 
Questionnaire survey is the most common research method used to obtain a risk-
allocation scheme in PPPs. For instances, Li et al. (2005) developed a preferred risk 
allocation scheme for PPP projects in the United Kingdom based on an opinion survey with 
53 suitable responses; Roumboutsos and Anagnostopoulos (2008) conducted a similar 
survey using the same questionnaire in Greece and compared the findings to those in the 
UK; Jin and Doloi (2008) gathered data from an industry-wide survey to test the theoretical 
framework for understanding risk allocation practice in PPP projects. To increase the 
confidence level, the sample size for the survey was pegged at a minimum of two hundred 
(200) survey participants. 
Statistical Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), 20.0 was the main 
research analysis tool. The results of the research are presented in section five below. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
A thorough analysis of responses was used to gauge how to allocate each risk factor to 
different parties under PPPs. Precisely, the questionnaire was divided into two sections. The 
first section asks respondents to give their consent for voluntary participation in the study 
and draws key background information from respondents such as: sector, experience with 
PPP, managerial experience and PPP sectoral experience. The main purpose of this section is 
to collect useful background information of the respondents to conduct subsequent 
comparative analyses in the study.   
The second section solicits information on risk probability, risk impact and specific 
allocation preferences of the 46 risk factors between private and public sectors.  For 
robustness, a six-point Likert scale is used as a measurement scale for both the gauging of 
risk probability and risk impact. Regarding the probability of occurrence a six-point Likert 
scale ranges from 0-5, where, nil = 0, 1 = remote, 2= occasional, 3= probable, 4 = frequent 
and 5= very frequent. Regarding the severity of each risk factor, a six-point Likert scale 
ranges from 0-5 where, 0 = the impact is nil, 1= impact is negligible with no serious 
influence on the project, to 5= where impact is catastrophic, where the project would be 
aborted. 
Regarding the risk allocation, participants were asked to allocate the 46 risk factors to 
either the private or the public sector, or describe it as preferably ‗shared‘ between the public 
and private sector, where PB = public sector, PV = private sector, and SH = shared.  The 
respondents needed to meet two criteria before being invited to participate in the survey, 
which include (1) having extensive working experience within the infrastructure industry in 
Nigeria, and (2) having been involved in the management of PPP projects in Nigeria or at 
least have some knowledge and/or interest in the topic of PPP as practitioners. To be sure 
the participants are well knowledgeable and have some experience in PPPs, all respondents 
were required to currently hold or to have held management positions in the past either in 
the private, public or banking sectors. The varied practical working experience and relevant 
organizations of the identified practitioners as analysed below indeed uphold and reinforce 
the validity of this study.  
The preferred risk allocation of PPP projects in Nigeria between mainly the public 
and private sectors and other important stakeholder groups is analysed based on the 
calculated mean ratings, as shown in Table 1. The mean responses under each factor with 
corresponding standard deviations are equally presented. These mean responses range 
between 1 and 3: with 1 representing public, 2 shared and 3 private. Note however that the 
mean value and standard deviation of possible responses on each risk factor are 2 and 1 
respectively. 
The formula below, which is based on the assumed distribution of the normal 
distribution curve, is used to calculate the ranges within which PPP risks in Nigeria should 
be allocated to the contracting parties, i.e., 1 = mainly to the public sector, 2 = equally 
shared between the public and private sectors, and 3 = mainly to the private sector, 
corresponding to PB, SH and PV respectively in the survey (Chan et al. 2011) using: 
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Where X10% = the values of upper and lower limits within which the risk should be 
allocated to a specified party; U = the mean value of the population, Z = corresponding Z 
value as computed from the normal curve table; σ = population standard deviation. Here, 
the mean value is 2, and the range for 'equally shared' is between 1.875 and 2.125. Therefore, 
taking 0.125 as the corresponding Z value and standard deviation of 1 for this calculation, 
the lower and upper limits for the range are 1.875 scores and 2.125 scores, respectively. 
Hence, if the mean value is lower than 1.875 scores, the risk should be mainly borne by the 
public sector. If the mean value is between 1.875 scores and 2.125 scores, then the risk 
should be equally shared between the public and private sectors. If the mean value is greater 
than 2.125 scores, the risk should be mainly borne by the private sector.  
Some sensitivity tests were carried out to see if the risk allocation preferences would 
alter significantly, using two standard deviations as opposed to using only one. Still following 
the logic of normal distribution curve, with the mean value remaining at 2, the range of 
‗equally shared‘ risk factors represent mean scores lying between 1.836 and 2.164. Hence, if 
the mean value of any risk factor is lower than 1.836 scores, the risk should be borne 
exclusively by the public sector. If the mean value lies between 1.836 and 2.164 scores, then 
the risk should be equally shared between the public and private sectors. However, if the 
value is greater than 2.164 scores, then the risk should be borne by the private sector. The 
results of these tests show that risk allocation preferences remain largely the same and 
merely altered for 6 out of the 46 risk factors considered in this study.   
This approach for determining risk allocation preferences is considered more reliable 
and accurate than those applied in similar studies (Li et al. 2005; Andi 2006; El-Sayegh 2008). 
For example, their method of determining risk allocation preferences is dependent on 
whether the risk factors receive more than 50% agreement from the respondents (i.e. 
preponderance of opinion). If a risk does not receive more than 50% agreement, it will be 
christened as ―undecided.‖ Such a classification is purely hypothetical and does not reflect 
the industry practice (Chan et al. 2011). 
Table 1 shows that a total of 27 out of the 46 risk factors are preferred to be 
allocated to the private sector, representing 59% of the total risk factors; these risk factors 
are: (1) poor financial market, (2) lack of tradition of private provision of public services, (3) 
geotechnical conditions, (4) weather, (5) level of demand for project, (6) availability of 
finance, (7) financial attraction of projects to investors, (8) high finance costs (9) residual 
risks, (10) design deficiency, (11) unproven engineering techniques (12) construction cost 
overrun, (13) construction time delay, (14) material/labour availability, (15) late design 
changes, (16) poor quality workmanship, (17) excessive contract variation, (18) 
insolvency/default of sub-contractors or suppliers (19) operation cost overrun, (20) 
operational revenues below expectation, (21) low operating productivity, (22) maintenance 
costs higher than expected, (23) maintenance more frequent than expected, (24) organization 
and coordination risk, (25) differences in working method and know-how between partners, 
(26) third party tort liability, and (27) staff crises).   
A total of 8 risk factors (i.e. 17% of the 46 risk factors) are to be allocated to the 
public sector; these factors are: (1) unstable government, (2) expropriation or nationalisation 
of assets, (3) poor public decision-making process, (4) strong political opposition/hostility, 
(5) legislation change, (6) change in tax regulation (7) level of public opposition to project, 
and (8) delay in project approvals and permits. Perhaps as expected, all these risk factors are 
exogenous (Ibrahim et al., 2006) and fall either directly within government policy arena such 
that government is a position to manage the events when they crystallize. These results also 
corroborate with previous findings of Zhang et al (1998) and Li et al. (2005) for studies 
carried out in Hong Kong and UK respectively. 
A total of 11 risk factors (i.e. 24% of the 46 risk factors) are to be equally shared 
between the private and public sectors; the risk factors are as follows: (1) inflation rate 
volatility, (2) interest rate volatility, (3) influential economic events, (4) industrial regulatory 
change, (5) force majeure, (6) environment, (7) site availability, (8) inadequate experience in 
PPP/PFI, (9) inadequate distribution of responsibilities and risks, (10) inadequate 
distribution of authority in partnership, and (11) lack of commitment from either partner.  
Some of these risks are exogenous some are equally endogenous. This outcome negates the 
core empirical finding of relevant studies reviewed: where less than 10 of the identified risk 
factors were shared while others are either assigned to the public or to the private sector 
partner exclusively (see Zhang et al; 1998, Li et al, 2005; Ibrahim et al. 2006 etc.). 
One possible reason for the variation in our results and the only comparable study 
done in Nigeria (i.e. Ibrahim et al., 2006) is the fact that about 80% of the total respondents 






whereas in Ibrahim et al. (2006) bankers were not included at all. Even though by the reason 
of their core business they should in principle be more risk seeking than other stakeholders; 
though with caution as the experience of the Nigerian bankers with PPPs is still not very 
deep as expected in all new PPP environments. 
The analyses above show clearly the allocation preferences among the private and 
the public sectors in Nigeria. The results indicate the impact of the differing level of 
involvement and experience in PPP in Nigeria; where most of the risk factors are still 
preferred to be shared between the public and the private sector, contrary to previous 
studies, particularly a comparable study by Ibrahim et al. (2006) probably because of the 
composition of the survey respondents where most of the respondents are from the private 
sector and tend to be relatively more risk-averse. The analysis equally shows that with 
differing levels of expertise between the private sector operator and the public sector, the 
allocation preferences suggest that risks should be borne by the party best able to actually 
reduce the likelihood and impact of the bad outcomes. 
When viewed across the various groups, the opinions of all stakeholders are 
unanimous on 6 out of the 8 risk factors to be allocated to the public sector except, for the 
risk of change in tax regulation and level of public opposition to project. The risk of public 
opposition to project is germane and highly significant in Nigeria considering the outcome 
of the flagship PPP project in Nigeria (i.e. Lekki Road Project), where due to public 
opposition, Lagos State Government had to cough out the sum of N4 Billion ($25 million) 
in 2010 from its budget due to shadow toll regime put in place as a result of public 
opposition to the project (Guardian Newspaper, November 15, 2011). 
Likewise, the views of all stakeholders are unanimous on 17 out of the 27 risk factors 
to be allocated to the private sector, while their opinions are unanimous in only 1 out of the 
11 risk factors to be equally shared: i.e. the risk of influential economic events. 
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Table 1: Results of Risk Allocation 
Preferences 
 
    All Preferred    Public Preferred    Private Preferred    Banking 
Preferred 
Risk Factors N Mean SD Allocation N Mean SD Allocation N Mean SD Allocation N Mean SD Allocation 
Unstable Government 44 1.48 0.63 Public 8 1.50 0.76 Public 7 1.57 0.53 Public 29 1.45 0.63 Public 
Expropriation or Nationalisation of assets 44 1.52 0.79 Public 8 1.50 0.93 Public 7 1.57 0.98 Public 29 1.52 0.74 Public 
Poor public decision-making process 44 1.50 0.63 Public 8 1.25 0.46 Public 7 1.29 0.49 Public 29 1.62 0.68 Public 
Strong political opposition/hostility 44 1.43 0.55 Public 8 1.50 0.53 Public 7 1.29 0.49 Public 29 1.45 0.57 Public 
Poor financial market 44 2.23 0.64 Private 8 2.00 0.76 Equally Shared 7 2.71 0.49 Private 29 2.17 0.60 Private 
Inflation rate volatility 44 1.91 0.68 Equally Shared 8 1.88 0.83 Equally Shared 7 1.86 0.38 Public 29 1.93 0.70 Equally Shared 
Interest rate volatility 44 2.11 0.69 Equally Shared 8 2.25 0.71 Private 7 2.43 0.53 Private 29 2.00 0.71 Equally Shared 
Influential economic events 44 1.98 0.51 Equally Shared 8 2.00 0.00 Equally Shared 7 2.00 0.58 Equally Shared 29 1.97 0.57 Equally Shared 
Legislation change 44 1.57 0.73 Public 8 1.38 0.74 Public 7 1.57 0.79 Public 29 1.62 0.73 Public 
Change in tax regulation 44 1.86 0.88 Public 8 1.75 0.89 Public 7 1.86 1.07 Public 29 1.90 0.86 Equally Shared 
Industrial regulatory change 44 1.95 0.83 Equally Shared 8 1.88 0.83 Equally Shared 7 1.71 0.76 Public 29 2.03 0.87 Equally Shared 
Lack of tradition of private provision of 
public 
Services 
44 2.16 0.68 Private 8 2.00 0.76 Equally Shared 7 2.29 0.76 Private 29 2.17 0.66 Private 
Level of public opposition to project 44 1.84 0.61 Public 8 1.63 0.74 Public 7 1.71 0.49 Public 29 1.93 0.59 Equally Shared 
Force majeure 44 2.05 0.53 Equally Shared 8 1.88 0.35 Equally Shared 7 2.14 0.38 Private 29 2.07 0.59 Equally Shared 
Geotechnical conditions 44 2.23 0.48 Private 8 2.50 0.53 Private 7 1.86 0.38 Public 29 2.24 0.44 Private 
Weather 44 2.16 0.37 Private 8 2.13 0.35 Equally Shared 7 2.00 0.00 Equally Shared 29 2.21 0.41 Private 
Environment 44 2.00 0.43 Equally Shared 8 2.13 0.35 Equally Shared 7 1.71 0.49 Public 29 2.03 0.42 Equally Shared 
Land acquisition (site availability) 44 1.89 0.84 Equally Shared 8 1.50 0.76 Public 7 2.00 1.00 Equally Shared 29 1.97 0.82 Equally Shared 
Level of demand for project 44 2.25 0.58 Private 8 2.13 0.64 Equally Shared 7 2.43 0.53 Private 29 2.24 0.58 Private 
Availability of finance 44 2.43 0.59 Private 8 2.38 0.74 Private 7 2.57 0.53 Private 29 2.41 0.57 Private 
Financial attraction of project to investors 44 2.52 0.55 Private 8 2.38 0.52 Private 7 2.71 0.49 Private 29 2.52 0.57 Private 




Residual risks 44 2.25 0.58 Private 8 2.13 0.35 Equally Shared 7 2.57 0.53 Private 29 2.21 0.62 Private 
Delay in project approvals and permits 44 1.66 0.71 Public 8 1.13 0.35 Public 7 1.57 0.79 Public 29 1.83 0.71 Public 
Design deficiency 44 2.45 0.66 Private 8 2.63 0.74 Private 7 2.29 0.76 Private 29 2.45 0.63 Private 
Unproven engineering techniques 44 2.57 0.62 Private 8 2.75 0.71 Private 7 2.43 0.53 Private 29 2.55 0.63 Private 
Construction cost overrun 44 2.32 0.60 Private 8 2.50 0.53 Private 7 2.43 0.53 Private 29 2.24 0.64 Private 
Construction time delay 44 2.32 0.56 Private 8 2.50 0.53 Private 7 2.29 0.49 Private 29 2.28 0.59 Private 
Material/labour availability 44 2.57 0.50 Private 8 2.63 0.52 Private 7 2.86 0.38 Private 29 2.48 0.51 Private 
Late design changes 44 2.32 0.56 Private 8 2.50 0.53 Private 7 2.29 0.49 Private 29 2.28 0.59 Private 
Poor quality workmanship 44 2.48 0.66 Private 8 2.75 0.71 Private 7 2.43 0.98 Private 29 2.41 0.57 Private 
Excessive contract variation 44 2.16 0.75 Private 8 2.25 0.89 Private 7 2.29 0.95 Private 29 2.10 0.67 Equally Shared 
Insolvency/default of sub-contractors or 
suppliers 
44 2.64 0.61 Private 8 2.63 0.74 Private 7 2.57 0.79 Private 29 2.66 0.55 Private 
Operation cost overrun 44 2.45 0.63 Private 8 2.50 0.76 Private 7 2.43 0.79 Private 29 2.45 0.57 Private 
Operational revenues below expectation 44 2.36 0.61 Private 8 2.13 0.64 Equally Shared 7 2.29 0.76 Private 29 2.45 0.57 Private 
Low operating productivity 44 2.43 0.59 Private 8 2.50 0.53 Private 7 2.29 0.76 Private 29 2.45 0.57 Private 
Maintenance costs higher than expected 44 2.41 0.58 Private 8 2.25 0.71 Private 7 2.57 0.53 Private 29 2.41 0.57 Private 
Maintenance more frequent than expected 44 2.39 0.62 Private 8 2.63 0.52 Private 7 2.14 0.69 Private 29 2.38 0.62 Private 
Organization and co-ordination risk 44 2.34 0.61 Private 8 2.50 0.53 Private 7 2.29 0.76 Private 29 2.31 0.60 Private 
Inadequate experience in PPP/PFI 44 2.07 0.50 Equally Shared 8 2.38 0.52 Private 7 2.29 0.49 Private 29 1.93 0.46 Equally Shared 
Inadequate distribution of responsibilities and 
risks 
44 2.05 0.57 Equally Shared 8 1.88 0.35 Equally Shared 7 1.86 0.38 Public 29 2.14 0.64 Private 
Inadequate distribution of authority in 
partnership 
44 2.11 0.58 Equally Shared 8 1.75 0.46 Public 7 2.14 0.38 Private 29 2.21 0.62 Private 
Differences in working method and know-
how 
between partners 
44 2.16 0.61 Private 8 2.25 0.46 Private 7 2.00 0.58 Equally Shared 29 2.17 0.66 Private 
Lack of commitment from either partner 44 2.00 0.61 Equally Shared 8 2.00 0.00 Equally Shared 7 2.29 0.76 Private 29 1.93 0.65 Equally Shared 
Third Party Tort Liability 44 2.20 0.63 Private 8 2.38 0.52 Private 7 2.00 0.82 Equally Shared 29 2.21 0.62 Private 
Staff Crises 44 2.32 0.60 Private 8 2.38 0.52 Private 7 2.43 0.79 Private 29 2.28 0.59 Private 
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The research confirmed that most risks in PPPs are preferred to be allocated 
to the private sector following the general principle of transferring risks to 
party in the best position to control the events that may occur: 58% of the 
risk factors used in this study were to be transferred to the private sector, 
while 17% of the risks are to be allocated to the public sector, while only 
24% of the risks are meant to be shared between the two parties. It means 
that it is recognized that private sector has better control over events that 
may deter the achievement of established objectives of PPP projects. 
Generally, the principle is to allocate PPP risks to the party best able 
to control its occurrence or manage their consequences as well as to the party 
in the best position to assess the probability of the risk crystalizing within a 
context commercially acceptable to the private sector. However, risk 
allocation may vary between projects; for example, the tunnelling section of a 
road construction project may be an unacceptable risk for the contractors, 
lenders, and investors due to the probability and the impact of the risk as a 
result of unknown geological conditions. 
Risk allocation may also vary between markets depending on the 
appetite (risk preferences) and the level of competition among players.  
In some jurisdictions, certain risks may be allocated by law to the 
public or private sector for political or historical reasons and any contractual 
arrangement to the contrary will have no legal effect. Therefore, in practice, 
legal constraints and the ability of the relevant party to assume a given risk 
must be taken into account regardless of which party is more efficient at 
controlling and managing the risks (Farquharson, 2011). Also whilst risk 
allocation in PPPs generally forces the private sector to bear a significant part 
of the construction and operational risks, the actual risk allocation may differ 
from what was originally planned. Infact, empirical evidence supports that 
risk allocation in practice often departs from what is laid out in theory (see 
e.g. Lobina and Hall, 2003). As stressed by The World Bank, ―whether PPPs 
perform better than full provision by state-owned enterprises depends in 
particular on whether performance risk is effectively shifted from taxpayers 
to the private shareholders of the company that enters into a concession-type 
arrangement‖ (2002: 23-24). 
Overall, since issues and dynamics of risk allocation may have some 
similarities across projects, it is preferable and highly recommended for the 
public sector to have a consistent approach and a clear framework for 
contracting as well as soliciting and evaluating bids from the PPP 
contractors. This framework should be enshrined in the policy document and 
guidelines for PPPs at every level of government that seeks to engage with 
the private sector in PPPs. 
It should also be noted that PPPs are by no means a panacea to all 
infrastructure challenges. This paper concedes that private sector engagement 
in the provision of infrastructure should in theory improve the quality of 
projects get undertaken. However, it is highly unlikely that a politically 
expedient but financially dubious project would be able to generate enough 
money to incentivise private sector partners. Experience shows that cost-




projects go bad, leaving half-built roads and schools-they become a public 
problem. Private investments might well end up being recouped in higher 
user charges.10 
One of the practical policy recommendations to this challenge is to 
run a truly transparent and competitive PPP tender process. Prior to the 
commencement of a procurement process, it is germane for public entities to 
strategically approach the market with a well-defined, well-structured and 
‗well-derisked‘ PPP projects; failure to do this will result in bidders making 
bids that are either incomparable with each other or deliberately present low 
bids with a view to resolving uncertainties through post-bid negotiation or 
through post-contract renegotiation. 
Overall, this research confirmed the views that most risks are meant 
to be allocated to the private sector partner, while government should still 
retain some risks such as political risks and site availability. However, 
suggested areas of further research include, but not limited to the following 
areas: 
 The practical validation of the suggested risk allocation preferences in 
real life situations and circumstances to see if actual risk allocation 
will conform to the preferences showed in this study; 
 The practical implications of supporting projects with Viability Gap 
Funding: perhaps it will be interesting to see if this could even 
compound agency problems in PPPs; 
 To test whether cost overruns under PPPs are more or less likely 
than under traditional procurement using an agency theoretic 
framework; and 
 To examine the factors that could make risk allocation preferences 




















                                                 
10 See ―Investing in Infrastructure: A Question of Trust, Chicago Pioneers a New Way of 
Paying for Infrastructure‖(The Economist, May 12, 2012). 
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